PRIMARY-SOURCE REVIEW · 2026-11-14T09:00:00+09:00
ScreenConnect / SCKit: RMM+ empty-key condition and RelayTrap reverse spread to technician workstations
Microsoft published its analysis of SCKit and RelayTrap on 11/13. It separates 2 distinct attack surfaces: the reported server-side entry via RMM+ extensions (where versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted an empty access key when none was configured) and the client-side RelayTrap path that delivers a payload from a compromised customer endpoint to a connecting technician workstation (blocked by the CVE-2026-84869 fix in client 26.6.5+). SCKit silently installs a separate client tied to attacker infrastructure and persists via scheduled tasks and registry Run entries.
What to check
Removing an unauthorized ScreenConnect client alone does not clear scheduled-task or registry Run persistence or invalidate hijacked web sessions. Verify every technician client is at 26.6.5+, keep affected RMM+ extensions disabled, and investigate both technician workstations and downstream customer endpoints to revoke sessions and remove persistence.
A first fixed version is listed only when the advisory provides one. Advisory counts are not incident counts.
Primary sources
Microsoft Security Blog SCKit analysis / ConnectWise Trust Center advisory
Related topics
UnrealIRCd: added to KEV, label-tag newline injection executes commands with server authority · Check Point DynamicCLI: added to KEV, root privilege escalation via 0777 local socket · Apache APISIX: 7 flaws across identity headers, path normalization and openapi-to-mcp boundaries · Dropbear SSH: authorized_keys permitopen/permitlisten restrictions are not enforced on Unix-socket forwarding · NLTK: 5 canonical advisories for C-extension path bypass, corpus symlinks and parser CPU exhaustion · SvelteKit: 4 advisories for adapter route-config injection and Node server crashes · OpenTelemetry (JS / Go / Python): unredacted server-span query strings, attribute-length bypass and header parsing